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OPINION
The basis for decisions to end
life. The Schiavo dilemma: an
essay by the special guardian
ad Litem
Jay Wolfson
Colleges of Public Health and Medicine, Florida Health Information
Center, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA
At age four, my eldest son once asked me “Daddy, how old
are people when they die?”. I allowed “As old as they are
going to get”. In this, Theresa Marie Schiavo, who died at
41, is no different from Pope John Paul II, who died at 87.
They were each as old as they were going to get. One died
as a consequence of an express decision to remove a medical
intervention, the other as a consequence of the natural course
of illness.
In late October of 2003, I was appointed by the State of
Florida to serve as the Special Guardian ad Litem to Theresa
Maria Schiavo, subsequent to a specially enacted Florida
Law (Terri’s Law). I was charged with reviewing the then
14 years of medical and legal history and documentation in
the case, and reporting to the Governor and the courts as to
the feasibility of conducting additional tests. To accomplish
this, I reviewed more than 30 000 pages of legal and medical
documents, visited frequently with my ward, Ms Schiavo,
and worked with her family and attorneys. My interactions
with Ms Schiavo were very direct and intimate: I would
visit her for as long as four hours at a time, sometimes more
than once a day. I would hold her hand, stroke her hair, hold
her head in my hands, and seek some evidence that she was
capable of responding, rather than merely exhibiting
reflexive behaviors. I begged and cajoled her, played music
for her, and asked her parents to help me elicit responses. I
had only thirty days to prepare my final report.
Ms Schiavo lived to be 41 years old, but her conscious
awareness and interaction during life lasted for only 26 of
those years. At the age of 26 she suffered a cardiac arrest
that led to profound brain damage, resuscitation, a
tracheotomy and respirator-assisted breathing, insertion of
a gastric feeding tube, a subsequent month-long coma,
followed by fifteen years in what was early and consistently
diagnosed as being a persistent vegetative state (PVS).
During the first four years following Ms Schiavo’s
accident, extensive efforts were deployed to rehabilitate her.
She was given intense physical and occupational therapy
and was brought to California by her husband to have
experimental electrodes implanted in her brain. None of this
elicited positive responses or anything other than continued
prognoses of no reasonable medical hope of recovery. Her
husband and her parents did not embrace that prognosis,
but did not categorically refute it until some years later.
Prior to her collapse in the early hours of a February
morning in 1990, the Schiavos had spent nearly a year and
a half seeking fertility counseling from an obstetrician. They
very much wanted children, but were having difficulty. For
years prior to that, there is undisputed evidence that Ms
Schiavo had succeeded in battling a significant weight
problem. By the time she was 18, she weighed 250 pounds,
and decided to change her life. Six years into her marriage
to Michael, she had achieved a weight of only 110 pounds,
and there remains circumstantial evidence that she may have
had an eating disorder. Indeed, after her collapse, Mr Schiavo
sued the fertility specialist for failing to adequately assess
his wife’s physical health and her probable eating disorder.
It was a long-shot case, but nearly four years after her
accident, a jury awarded over a million US dollars to the
couple: $300 000 to Mr Schiavo for loss of consortium, and
more than $700 000 to Ms Schiavo for maintenance, given
the futility of her circumstance. From that point forward, a
world of change occurred in the lives of the Schiavos and
Theresa’s parents, the Schindlers.
For the next 11 years, the families would exercise their
hostilities in court: the Schindlers seeking to remove Michael
from guardianship over his wife; and Michael protecting
what he consistently stated to be his wife’s best interests
and specific intentions. It got nasty and then nastier. In the
end, Ms Schiavo became somebody known about around
the world, but known to only a few. Her parents succeeded
in garnering the active support of the Governor of Florida,
the Florida Legislature, the Congress of the United States,
the President of the United States, and Pope John Paul II.
All this was done while now common photos and home
videos of her partially clad, patently disabled body were
projected on tabloids and television screens. All of this was
done without her awareness or knowledge.
Only the courts, at the state and federal levels, stood
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measures by state and federal legislators and chief
executives, the local circuit court was joined by state and
federal courts of appeal and the supreme courts in upholding
Ms Schiavo’s right, through the evidence provided, not to
remain in her state and to be allowed to have her feeding
tube removed and die.
What was the value of the clinical information and the
clinical interventions deployed in Ms Schiavo’s case? How
did these data coincide with the law? And what happens
when there is a disconnect between clinical standards and
decisions that cause the ultimate aging phenomenon: death?
Here is the dilemma in a nutshell. The technical standards
of evidence in each state’s judicial system vary around the
issue of how to determine an individual’s intentions about
end-of-life decisions. But the medical science underlying
the determination of neurological states should be far more
consistent. By this is implied that there should be clear and
convincing, empirically derived clinical guidelines and
measures for specific medical conditions, such as
“persistently vegetative”.
Is it reasonable to assume that standards developed by
national organizations, such as the American Academy of
Neurology (AAN); and statutes crafted following years of
bipartisan efforts, such as the Florida guardianship laws,
should serve as the guidelines against which life and death
decisions shall be made when there is controversy among family
members or between families and institutions/providers? Dr
Ronald Cranford, the distinguished neurologist who
provided expert opinions in the cases of Karen Ann Quinlan,
Nancy Cruzan, and Theresa Schiavo, points to the
professionally crafted AAN guidelines as the gold standard
for assessing persons in PVS. Yet PVS itself has been
subjected to allegations of nebulous and even misapplication
by some neurologists and many others, particularly in light
of claims that there exists a “minimally conscious state” or
“locked-in syndrome” which might be missed.
According to Florida law, persons diagnosed with PVS
fall into the same category as those with terminal and end-
of-life disease states. This became important in Ms Schiavo’s
case because of the reasonable issues surrounding care,
continuation of care, interventions versus maintenance, and
most vitally, decisions to end life. And these factors, despite
what may be consistent scientific definitions of a disease,
will always be subject to distinctive state laws regarding
how decisions about end-of-life can be made.
For example, in the case of Nancy Cruzan, Ms Cruzan
had clearly articulated an intention not to be kept alive in
her severely debilitated state following a horrific car
accident. But that articulation was verbal and not written; it
was not memorialized in the particular fashion required by
Missouri law. For that reason, while the US Supreme Court
recognized the nature of her condition and the futility of
her circumstance; and further acknowledged that she may
have articulated an intent, they placed express Missouri law
above the science and medical guidelines. The Cruzan case
clearly established that the laws of the individual states
would serve as the bases for the application of the medical
science.
That is why in the case of Ms Schiavo, the nexus seemed
for many to favor a relatively easy resolution of the dispute
that emerged between her parents and her husband over the
latter’s decision to help Ms Schiavo die by removing her
feeding tube. And this is where the vicissitudes of law and
medicine formed a sticky nexus that to this day has created
monstrous political, spiritual, and even clinical chasms
across America over end-of-life applications.
Ms Schiavo did not have a formal, written, executed
advance directive. She did not have a healthcare surrogate
authorizing anybody to make decisions in her stead; and
she did not have a living will articulating in writing her
intentions regarding heroic measures, clinical interventions,
or her wish with respect to being kept alive by artificial
means if she were in a diagnosed persistent vegetative state.
But Florida law provides for means by which Ms Schiavo’s
intentions were established.
First, Mr Schiavo had been formally appointed by the
Florida courts to serve as his wife’s legal guardian shortly
after the accident, and this was undisputed by her parents.
In fact, for nearly four years, Mr Schiavo worked closely
with his in laws to provide care and attention to the common
object of their affections, Theresa. By virtue of this
guardianship status, Mr Schiavo was empowered, in Florida,
to make many decisions about his wife, her property, and
her care. But he could not independently make the decision
to terminate her artificial nutrition.
Second, Mr Schiavo placed into evidence statements
made by his wife, prior to her accident, overheard by him
and other witnesses. These statements established that Ms
Schiavo had expressed a clear intention not to be kept alive
if she were ever to be in a permanently unconscious state.
While the validity of these statements was challenged by
Ms Schiavo’s parents, the Florida courts determined that
they represented credible evidence of Ms Schiavo’s
intentions; that the credibility was clear and convincing; andClinical Interventions in Aging 2006:1(1) 5
Opinion
that the Florida Rules of Evidence supported their admission
and acceptance.
Third, once these intentions had been established, then
Mr Schiavo was able to exercise “substituted judgment” on
behalf of his wife, acting in her “best interests”. This is a
key to what followed, because it then brought in the element
of medical judgment, in part as a formality, to establish that
Ms Schiavo was, in fact, in a PVS. At that juncture, the war
of the experts was initiated: something common in many
court battles, but particularly colored in this case because
of the nature of the clinical evidence and the science.
The diagnosis of PVS is not based upon blood tests or
radiographs or other mechanical/electrical tests. Rather, it
is a functional diagnosis that is made by the physician in
concert with those tests, and is predicated on the physician’s
determinations that the patient meets the functional clinical
checkpoints of the American College of Neurology.
And this is where the good science and medicine began
to melt in the face of hope, beliefs, and value sets that
disagreed substantively and vehemently with the very
principle of allowing a living human being to be removed
from any extant form of life support and allowed to die. As
Ms Schiavo’s parents stated during court proceedings, even
if Ms Schiavo had executed a living will, they would have
sought to nullify it because of their beliefs and their attested
certainty about her beliefs regarding termination of life.
The point here is that the science and the medical
guidelines became irrelevant in the face of belief systems
that rejected them as inhuman and unconscionable. That is
in great part why Florida’s Governor Jeb Bush took such a
strong and visible stand against the removal of the artificial
feeding tube and continued to fight for her parent’s right to
keep her alive.
The disconnect here is that in the face of the science and
medicine that established her condition, and the state law
that had carved out how decisions may be made for persons
in that condition, it took eleven years, court challenges, state
and federal laws, papal statements, and the engagement of
political forces at the highest levels before a conclusion was
reached in the singular life of Ms Schiavo. And that
conclusion was predicated expressly upon the judgment of
the state and federal court systems that:
￿ the specific scientific bases upon which Ms Schiavo had
been diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetate state
were valid (ie, the AAN guidelines);
￿ Florida Law clearly established artificial nutrition as a
medical intervention that could be removed in particular
instances where PVS and the intention of the patient not
to be maintained by artificial means were established;
￿ the testimony of physician experts establishing that Ms
Schiavo was PVS met the “clear and convincing”
evidentiary level required by Florida law;
￿ the evidence supporting Mr Schiavo’s substituted
judgment to remove her feeding tube was “clear and
convincing”.
Indeed, the court system remained singularly consistent in
its determination of the above, even though it afforded
exquisite flexibility to Ms Schiavo’s parents, allowing them
to re-file same or similar motions for years.
So, the accepted clinical guidelines were applied and
the law was followed. Ms Schiavo’s artificial feeding tube
was removed, for the third time, during Easter week of 2005,
in the midst of additional international drama over the death
of Pope John Paul II. The Pope, some months earlier, had
issued a non-encyclical statement admonishing against the
removal of artificial nutrition. On the day that Ms Schiavo’s
feeding tube was removed, his was inserted. Ms Schiavo
died 13 days later, and then the Pope’s death took over the
national media stage.
Ms Schiavo’s autopsy revealed what many close to the
case clinically knew all along: the degree of atrophy and
damage to her brain was profound, indeed, greater than some
had predicted. Contrary to desperate allegations, there was
no evidence of trauma. And the medical examiner could
not categorically state the reason for her initial collapse,
though a significant electrolyte imbalance due to bulimia
was not ruled out. It was not possible to confirm the diagnosis
of PVS, which requires a functional assessment in concert
with other tests. So the prevailing expert opinions stood.
Ms Schiavo was as old as she was going to get when she
died. Her husband and many others, argue that she “left this
world” the night of her collapse in 1990. Her parents and
their supporters, argue that she was killed: starved to death
because of her inability to interact and her dependence on a
simple plastic tube for food and water.
Standards of care and guidelines for diagnosis and
treatment were followed and incorporated into the carefully
crafted laws of the State of Florida. Had Ms Schiavo lived
in Missouri, New Jersey, or New York State, she would not
have been subject to the substituted judgment rule and she
would be kept alive. In a healthcare system where we give
some considerable lip service to evidence-based criteria and
consistent outcomes, how do we square the application of
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correlates of aging”? Indeed we can be right and wrong at
the same time. We can do the right thing and achieve results
that create not only dissonance within our society, but
substantive questions about what we are really up to.
These matters take on increasing importance as we face
the challenges of allocating scarce resources to an aging
population. This topic has come in and out of political favor
in the States, and has remained rather dormant since the
early 1990s. A US public radio commentator, Daniel Schorr
noted that perhaps Ms Schiavo will “unconsciously” cause
us to revisit the rapidly growing challenges of resource
decisions.
Figure 1 Theresa Marie Schiavo’s recently erected gravestone.